libterm.com Infallibilism asserts that knowledge requires absolute certainty, meaning a belief qualifies as knowledge only if it cannot be mistaken. This philosophical stance challenges opinions that tolerate any degree of doubt, emphasizing that true knowledge is unerring and indisputable. Explore the rest of this article to understand how infallibilism shapes debates in epistemology and its implications for your quest for certainty.
Table of Comparison
| Aspect | Infallibilism | Epistemic Closure |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | The view that knowledge requires absolute certainty; no possibility of error. | The principle that knowledge is closed under known logical implication. |
| Core Claim | To know a proposition, one must not be mistaken about it. | If a person knows P, and knows P implies Q, then the person knows Q. |
| Epistemic Consequences | Strict standard limits knowledge; skepticism often follows. | Supports logical consistency and knowledge transfer through deduction. |
| Relation to Skepticism | Heightens skepticism due to demanding infallibility. | Used in skeptical arguments to challenge knowledge claims. |
| Philosophical Proponents | Descartes (early formulations), some analytic epistemologists. | Common in classical epistemology; endorsed by many traditional epistemologists. |
| Criticism | Often considered too strict or unrealistic for ordinary knowledge. | Challenged by contextualists and those rejecting closure principles. |
Introduction to Infallibilism and Epistemic Closure
Infallibilism asserts that knowledge requires absolute certainty, meaning a belief counts as knowledge only if it cannot be mistaken. Epistemic closure is the principle that if a subject knows a proposition and knows that this proposition entails another, then they also know the entailed proposition. The tension between infallibilism and epistemic closure arises because infallibilism sets stringent certainty conditions that often challenge the principle of epistemic closure in retaining knowledge under entailment.
Defining Infallibilism: Foundations and Principles
Infallibilism posits that knowledge requires absolute certainty, asserting that no true knowledge can be held if error is possible. This epistemological stance demands that justification must guarantee truth, rejecting fallible beliefs as genuine knowledge. Its foundation rests on the principle that knowledge entails inevitability of truth, contrasting with fallibilism's allowance for provisional or defeasible justification.
Understanding Epistemic Closure in Epistemology
Epistemic closure in epistemology asserts that if a person knows a proposition and also knows that this proposition entails another, then they must also know the entailed proposition. This principle is vital for understanding how knowledge is transmitted through logical implication, contrasting with infallibilism, which holds that knowledge requires absolute certainty. Debate around epistemic closure emphasizes its role in addressing skepticism by supporting a structured, reliable framework for knowledge acquisition and retention.
Historical Origins and Intellectual Context
Infallibilism, rooted in Cartesian skepticism, insists that knowledge requires absolute certainty, originating from Rene Descartes' quest for indubitable foundations in the 17th century. Epistemic closure, formalized in 20th-century analytic philosophy by thinkers like Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, revolves around the principle that knowledge is closed under known logical implication, reflecting concerns about the transmission of knowledge through inference. Both concepts emerged within the broader intellectual context of responding to skepticism and refining theories of knowledge justification in epistemology.
Key Philosophical Arguments for Infallibilism
Infallibilism asserts that knowledge requires absolute certainty, meaning beliefs must be immune to any possible error to qualify as knowledge, challenging traditional claims of knowledge based on fallible justification. Key philosophical arguments for infallibilism emphasize that without infallibility, knowledge cannot truly differentiate from mere belief or justified opinion, anchoring epistemic certainty in an unassailable foundation. This stance critiques epistemic closure principles by asserting that if knowledge requires infallibility, the closure under known entailment may fail, since deducing new propositions from fallible knowledge does not guarantee infallible knowledge.
Challenges and Critiques of Epistemic Closure
Epistemic closure, which asserts that knowledge is closed under known implication, faces challenges such as skepticism and the problem of cognitive limitations in identifying all logical consequences. Critics argue that closure principles may lead to paradoxes when applied to skeptical scenarios, undermining ordinary knowledge claims. These critiques highlight the difficulty of maintaining closure without accepting radical skepticism, contrasting with infallibilism's demand for absolute certainty in knowledge.
Comparative Analysis: Infallibilism vs Epistemic Closure
Infallibilism asserts that knowledge requires absolute certainty, implying that justified belief must be immune to error, whereas epistemic closure maintains that if a subject knows a proposition and knows that this proposition entails another, then the subject also knows the entailed proposition. The primary comparative point reveals that infallibilism challenges the validity of epistemic closure by demanding infallible justification, which often conflicts with the closure principle's allowance for fallible knowledge transmission. By examining scenarios involving skepticism, infallibilism's strict standards can undermine closure, while epistemic closure supports a more flexible, yet robust, approach to knowledge inference.
Implications for Knowledge and Skepticism
Infallibilism, the view that knowledge requires absolute certainty, challenges traditional epistemic closure principles by rejecting that knowledge can be preserved under known logical entailment if any uncertainty exists. This stance intensifies skepticism, as it demands irrefutable evidence for knowledge claims, thereby limiting what can be confidently known. Epistemic closure, which maintains that knowledge extends through justified entailments, counters skepticism by preserving knowledge across logical implications, fostering a more optimistic understanding of epistemic conditions.
Notable Philosophers and Their Positions
Notable philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga advocate for infallibilism, maintaining that knowledge requires certainty and that belief must be infallible to qualify as knowledge. On the other hand, Fred Dretske and Ernest Sosa support epistemic closure, arguing that if a subject knows a proposition, then they also know all its logical consequences, emphasizing the transferability of knowledge through known implications. Critics like Robert Nozick challenge both positions, proposing alternative theories like tracking theory, which reject strict infallibilism and the closure principle to better account for fallible human knowledge.
Conclusion: Future Directions in Epistemological Debates
Future directions in epistemological debates emphasize refining the relationship between infallibilism and epistemic closure to better address challenges of knowledge attribution and justification. Emerging research explores hybrid models that balance infallible knowledge claims with practical closure principles to enhance explanatory power. Continued dialogue aims to integrate insights from both positions, advancing a more robust framework for understanding epistemic certainty and knowledge transmission.
Infallibilism Infographic
