libterm.com Eliminativism is a philosophical theory that argues certain common-sense mental states, like beliefs and desires, do not exist and should be replaced by neuroscientific explanations. This view challenges traditional psychology by suggesting that folk psychological concepts are fundamentally flawed and will eventually be eliminated. Explore the rest of the article to understand how eliminativism reshapes our comprehension of the mind and its implications for your everyday thinking.
Table of Comparison
| Aspect | Eliminativism | Supervenience |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | Denial of the existence of certain mental states, claiming they should be eliminated from scientific discourse. | The idea that mental states depend on physical states and cannot change without physical changes. |
| Ontological Commitment | Rejects the reality of folk psychological concepts like beliefs and desires. | Accepts mental properties as dependent but real, grounded in physical properties. |
| Relation to Physicalism | Radical form, claiming only physical entities truly exist. | Non-reductive physicalism, mental states supervene on physical states without reduction. |
| Implications for Mental States | Mental states are illusions or misconceptions; should be replaced by neuroscientific terms. | Mental states are real but entirely determined by brain states. |
| Philosophical Supporters | Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland. | David Armstrong, Jaegwon Kim. |
| Key Challenge | How to account for subjective experience if mental states are eliminated. | How to explain mental causation without reduction. |
Introduction to Eliminativism and Supervenience
Eliminativism posits that common-sense mental states, like beliefs and desires, do not exist as scientific entities and should be eliminated in favor of neurobiological explanations. Supervenience, in contrast, holds that mental properties depend on, but are not reducible to, physical states, maintaining that any change in mental states necessitates a change in underlying physical conditions. These views address the mind-body problem by debating whether mental phenomena are ontologically fundamental or entirely dependent on, yet irreducible to, physical substrates.
Historical Context and Philosophical Roots
Eliminativism emerged in the late 20th century as a radical stance in the philosophy of mind, rejecting common-sense mental states like beliefs and desires as flawed theoretical constructs, rooted in the rise of scientific naturalism and challenges to folk psychology. Supervenience, tracing back to mid-20th-century analytic philosophy, especially in the works of Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim, offers a non-reductive framework where higher-level mental properties depend systematically on lower-level physical states without being reducible. These contrasting positions reflect deep epistemological and metaphysical debates about the nature of mental phenomena and their relation to the physical world.
Defining Eliminativism: Key Concepts
Eliminativism asserts that common-sense mental states like beliefs and desires do not exist as coherent scientific entities and should be discarded in favor of neuroscientific explanations. This philosophical position challenges the folk psychological framework by arguing that our everyday mental vocabulary is fundamentally flawed and misleading. Key concepts of eliminativism include the rejection of propositional attitudes and the emphasis on brain states as the primary basis for understanding cognition.
Understanding Supervenience: Foundations and Variants
Supervenience is a metaphysical concept describing a relationship where higher-level properties depend systematically on lower-level properties, ensuring no change in the former without a change in the latter. Variants include strong supervenience, which holds across all possible worlds, and weak supervenience, applicable within a single world, highlighting differing scopes of dependence. Understanding these foundations clarifies debates in philosophy of mind, especially contrasting with eliminativism, which denies the existence of certain mental properties altogether.
Core Differences Between Eliminativism and Supervenience
Eliminativism asserts that certain mental states or concepts do not exist and should be discarded in scientific explanations, whereas supervenience maintains that mental states depend on physical states without being reducible to them. The core difference lies in eliminativism's rejection of traditional mental phenomena as illusory versus supervenience's view that mental properties systematically depend on but are not identical to physical properties. Eliminativism demands a radical revision of the ontology of mind, while supervenience supports a non-reductive physicalist framework preserving mental distinctiveness.
Major Arguments for Eliminativism
Eliminativism argues that common-sense mental states such as beliefs and desires do not exist because they lack a robust scientific basis, challenging the validity of folk psychology. Proponents emphasize that neurobiological explanations can better account for cognitive processes, rendering traditional mental state terms obsolete or misleading. Major arguments focus on the failure of predictive power and explanatory coherence in folk psychology compared to advanced neuroscientific models.
Principal Defenses of Supervenience
Supervenience is principally defended on the grounds that mental properties are dependent on physical states without reducibility, preserving distinct explanations while avoiding dualism. It maintains that any change in mental properties necessarily corresponds to a change in underlying physical properties, ensuring a robust correlation that eliminates epiphenomenal concerns. This contrasts with eliminativism, which denies the existence of mental properties altogether, instead arguing for the replacement of folk psychological concepts by neurophysiological explanations.
Implications for Philosophy of Mind
Eliminativism challenges the existence of traditional mental states, arguing that common-sense psychology is a fundamentally flawed framework that should be replaced by neuroscientific explanations. Supervenience, by contrast, asserts that mental states are dependent on physical states without reducibility, preserving mental properties as emergent but ontologically distinct phenomena. The implications for philosophy of mind include debates on the ontological status of mental states, the reducibility of mental phenomena to brain processes, and the feasibility of a unified theory integrating folk psychology with neuroscience.
Contemporary Debates and Criticisms
Eliminativism argues that common-sense psychological states like beliefs and desires do not exist, challenging traditional mental ontology, while supervenience holds that mental states depend on but cannot be reduced to physical states, maintaining a non-reductive physicalist stance. Contemporary debates center on the explanatory power and ontological commitments of each view, with critics of eliminativism pointing to its radical dismissal of subjective experience and opponents of supervenience highlighting its difficulties in accounting for mental causation. Recent philosophical discourse emphasizes refining these perspectives to address issues such as multiple realizability, the mind-body problem, and the empirical findings in cognitive neuroscience.
Future Directions and Open Questions
Future directions in the debate between eliminativism and supervenience emphasize integrating advances in cognitive neuroscience to clarify whether mental states can be wholly reduced or eliminated in favor of neural explanations. Open questions include how supervenience relations can accommodate emergent mental properties without invoking dualism, and whether eliminativism can account for the subjective quality and intentionality of experience. Further empirical research and refined philosophical models are necessary to resolve tensions and improve our understanding of mind-brain relations.
Eliminativism Infographic
