libterm.com Multiple realizability refers to the concept that a single mental state or function can be physically implemented in different ways across various systems or organisms. This idea challenges strict reductionist views by showing that the same higher-level phenomena can arise from diverse lower-level substrates. Explore the article to understand how multiple realizability impacts philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Table of Comparison
| Aspect | Multiple Realizability | Strong Supervenience |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | The concept that a single higher-level mental state can be realized by different lower-level physical states across various entities. | The principle that higher-level properties depend rigidly on lower-level properties in all possible worlds without exception. |
| Philosophical Domain | Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics | Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind |
| Key Focus | Diversity of physical bases for mental states | Invariance of higher-level properties given lower-level properties |
| Implication | Supports non-reductive physicalism, challenges identity theory | Establishes dependency without reduction, emphasizes property correlation |
| Relation to Reductionism | Opposes strict reduction by showing multiple physical realizations | Compatible with reductionism but emphasizes strict property dependence |
| Example | Mental pain realized by different neural structures across species | If two beings share the same physical base, they must share the same mental state |
Introduction to Multiple Realizability and Strong Supervenience
Multiple realizability refers to the phenomenon where a single mental state or property can be instantiated by different physical states across diverse organisms or systems, highlighting the flexibility in the relationship between mind and body. Strong supervenience denotes a strict dependence relation wherein no change in mental properties can occur without a corresponding change in physical properties, ensuring a consistent correlation between higher-level and lower-level states. Understanding these concepts aids in exploring how mental phenomena relate to physical substrates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Defining Multiple Realizability
Multiple realizability refers to the phenomenon where a single mental state or function can be instantiated by different physical states across diverse organisms or systems, emphasizing functional rather than material specificity. This concept challenges strict physicalist accounts by highlighting that mental properties do not map one-to-one with physical substrates but depend on higher-level organizational patterns. Strong supervenience, in contrast, requires that any difference in mental states necessitates a difference in physical states, reinforcing a more rigid dependence between mental and physical properties.
Understanding Strong Supervenience
Strong supervenience denotes a relationship where the properties of one set (e.g., mental states) depend rigidly on another set (e.g., physical states) such that no two entities can differ in mental properties without differing in physical properties. This concept is crucial for distinguishing physicalism from other metaphysical views by asserting that any change in mental properties necessitates a corresponding change in the physical substrate. Multiple realizability challenges this by showing that mental states can be instantiated by diverse physical states, yet strong supervenience maintains that all these physical realizations collectively determine the mental properties without exception.
Historical Background and Philosophical Context
Multiple realizability, a concept introduced by Hilary Putnam in the 1960s, challenges reductive physicalism by arguing that mental states can be instantiated by diverse physical substrates, making strict identity theories problematic. Strong supervenience, developed within analytic philosophy, asserts that if two entities are identical in all physical aspects, they must share all higher-level properties, emphasizing a dependency relation without guaranteeing reducibility. The philosophical context of these concepts centers on debates in the philosophy of mind, specifically around the nature of mental properties, physicalism, and the viability of reductionist explanations.
Key Differences Between Multiple Realizability and Strong Supervenience
Multiple realizability emphasizes that a single mental state or property can be instantiated by different physical states across varied systems, highlighting functional equivalence despite physical diversity. Strong supervenience asserts that any change in higher-level properties necessarily corresponds to a change in lower-level physical properties, ensuring a one-to-one dependency without exception. The key difference lies in multiple realizability allowing diverse physical implementations for the same property, while strong supervenience demands a strict, invariant physical basis for those properties.
Multiple Realizability in Philosophy of Mind
Multiple realizability in the philosophy of mind asserts that mental states can be instantiated by different physical states across varied species or systems, challenging reductive physicalist accounts. This concept undermines strong supervenience by demonstrating that no single physical base uniquely determines mental properties, emphasizing functional and organizational patterns over mere physical composition. Philosophers like Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor have extensively argued that multiple realizability supports the autonomy of psychological explanations from neurophysiological details.
Strong Supervenience and Physicalism
Strong supervenience is a metaphysical relation where any two entities identical in all physical properties must also be identical in all mental or higher-level properties, ensuring no variation of mental states without corresponding physical differences. This concept underpins physicalism by asserting that all phenomena, including mental events, are fully determined by physical states, thereby supporting the idea that mental properties depend on or are grounded in physical substrates. In contrast, multiple realizability challenges strict reductionism by allowing that the same mental state can be instantiated by different physical states across species or systems, but strong supervenience maintains a non-variant physical basis for these mental properties.
Critiques and Challenges to Multiple Realizability
Multiple realizability faces critiques for its reliance on broad functional categories that may obscure crucial physical differences, challenging its explanatory power in philosophy of mind. Critics argue that strong supervenience offers a more rigorous framework by emphasizing dependence relations between higher-level properties and specific physical bases, thus addressing ambiguities in multiple realizability. The debate highlights tensions in defining property identities and the limits of functionalism when accounting for complex mental and physical phenomena.
Objections to Strong Supervenience
Strong supervenience faces objections related to its inability to accommodate multiple realizability, where a single mental state corresponds to diverse physical states across different organisms or systems. Critics argue that strong supervenience's strict dependency on physical base properties fails to acknowledge the flexible, non-reductive nature of mental properties. This limitation undermines its explanatory power in philosophy of mind, as it cannot fully capture the varied physical realizations of identical mental phenomena.
Implications for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
Multiple realizability challenges reductionist approaches by showing that higher-level properties can be instantiated by diverse lower-level substrates, complicating the metaphysical grounding of mental states and natural kinds. Strong supervenience demands that no variation in higher-level properties occurs without corresponding differences in lower-level properties, reinforcing a hierarchical dependence crucial for scientific explanations. The tension between these concepts impacts debates on property ontology, causal relevance, and the feasibility of unified scientific theories in philosophy of science and metaphysics.
Multiple realizability Infographic
