libterm.com Quasi-realism is a metaethical view that seeks to explain how we can talk about moral statements as if they express objective truths without committing to their actual existence. This theory navigates between moral realism and anti-realism, attributing a quasi-objective status to ethical discourse. Discover more about how quasi-realism shapes our understanding of morality throughout the article.
Table of Comparison
| Aspect | Quasi-realism | Cognitivism |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | Metaethical view that moral statements express attitudes, yet mimic realist discourse. | Philosophy stance that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false. |
| Moral Language | Non-factual but treated as if factual through expressive function. | Factual and truth-apt language reflecting objective moral reality. |
| Truth-apt Status | Rejects objective truth; moral claims are not truth-apt. | Affirms moral propositions as truth-apt and verifiable. |
| Key Proponent | Simon Blackburn | J.L. Mackie (for error theory opposition), often A.J. Ayer, and other analytic philosophers. |
| Ethical Commitment | Expresses commitment without metaphysical moral facts. | Affirms existence or at least meaningfulness of moral facts for cognition. |
| Semantic Role | Explains how moral discourse functions without objective facts. | Supports moral reasoning through cognitive evaluation of moral truths. |
Introduction to Quasi-realism and Cognitivism
Quasi-realism posits that moral statements express attitudes rather than objective truths, aiming to capture the appearance of realism without committing to independent moral facts. Cognitivism asserts that moral judgments are capable of being true or false because they express beliefs about objective moral facts. Both perspectives engage with the nature of moral language, with cognitivism affirming truth-aptness and quasi-realism explaining moral discourse through non-realist commitments.
Historical Background of Metaethical Theories
Quasi-realism developed in the late 20th century as a response to expressivism, aiming to reconcile moral language's expressive function with a realist-seeming discourse, primarily advanced by philosopher Simon Blackburn. Cognitivism, with roots tracing back to classical ethical theories, asserts that moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false, influenced by early analytic philosophers like G.E. Moore and the later development of moral realism. These metaethical theories reflect ongoing debates about moral knowledge, objectivity, and the meaning of ethical statements throughout the history of philosophy.
Core Principles of Quasi-realism
Quasi-realism asserts that moral statements express attitudes rather than objective truths, aiming to explain how we talk as if moral facts exist without committing to their ontological reality. Core principles include the projection of our subjective attitudes onto the world, enabling moral discourse to mimic realist claims while remaining anti-realist in metaphysics. This approach contrasts with cognitivism, which holds that moral judgments are truth-apt and correspond to moral facts or properties.
Core Principles of Cognitivism
Cognitivism asserts that moral statements express beliefs subject to truth or falsity, emphasizing objective moral facts and rational evaluation. It holds that moral knowledge is attainable through reasoned analysis, as moral judgments aim to describe features of the world. Unlike quasi-realism, which treats moral discourse as expressive without committing to objective truth, cognitivism maintains that ethical propositions are capable of being true or false based on factual conditions.
Key Thinkers in Quasi-realism and Cognitivism
Key thinkers in Quasi-realism include Simon Blackburn, who argues that moral statements express attitudes rather than objective truths, and Allan Gibbard, who emphasizes norm-expressivism and the role of acceptance in moral judgment. In Cognitivism, prominent figures like Peter Railton defend a naturalistic approach where moral statements are truth-apt and grounded in objective facts, while Richard Boyd advocates for moral realism supported by epistemic reliability. These thinkers shape the debate by contrasting the expressivist commitments of Quasi-realism with the truth-conditional semantics of Cognitivism.
Differences in Moral Language Interpretation
Quasi-realism interprets moral language as expressing non-cognitive attitudes projected as if they were objective facts, emphasizing the emotive and expressive function of ethical statements. Cognitivism regards moral language as conveying truth-apt propositions that reflect objective moral facts or properties accessible through reason. This fundamental divergence shapes debates on moral disagreement, truth, and the nature of ethical judgments.
Metaethical Implications: Truth, Belief, and Attitude
Quasi-realism challenges traditional metaethical views by asserting that moral statements do not express truth-apt beliefs but instead project attitudes, making truth a secondary, constructed feature rather than an objective property. Cognitivism maintains that moral judgments are truth-apt, reflecting actual beliefs that can be objectively evaluated as true or false, underpinning ethical reasoning with a commitment to moral facts. The metaethical implications revolve around whether moral discourse commits speakers to objective truth claims (cognitivism) or primarily serves to express and influence attitudes without asserting independent moral facts (quasi-realism).
Criticisms of Quasi-realism vs Cognitivism
Quasi-realism faces criticism for seemingly undermining the objective basis of moral statements by treating them primarily as expressions of attitude rather than factual claims, which cognitivism upholds through moral realism and the truth-apt nature of ethical judgments. Cognitivism is often challenged for its difficulty in explaining moral disagreement and motivation, issues quasi-realism addresses by emphasizing the expressive and projective functions of moral language. Critics argue quasi-realism struggles with consistency in endorsing moral claims without objective grounding, while cognitivism is critiqued for potentially overlooking the emotive and social aspects of moral reasoning.
Practical Applications in Moral Reasoning
Quasi-realism enables moral reasoning by simulating objective truth claims while acknowledging the subjective nature of ethical judgments, enhancing flexibility in conflict resolution and ethical discussions. Cognitivism grounds moral reasoning in objective truths, facilitating clear, consistent frameworks for legal systems and policy-making by asserting that moral statements can be true or false. Both approaches impact practical decision-making by shaping how moral agents evaluate, justify, and communicate ethical principles in real-world scenarios.
Conclusion: Evaluating Quasi-realism and Cognitivism
Quasi-realism effectively bridges the gap between moral realism and anti-realism by preserving moral discourse without committing to objective moral facts, offering a nuanced explanation of ethical statements as expressions of attitudes. Cognitivism asserts that moral judgments are truth-apt and grounded in objective properties, enabling systematic moral reasoning and knowledge claims. Evaluating both, quasi-realism excels in accommodating moral practice without metaphysical commitments, whereas cognitivism provides a robust framework for moral objectivity, making the choice contingent on prioritizing metaphysical clarity or practical moral engagement.
Quasi-realism Infographic
